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ARTICLE
ORIGINALISM AND
THE COMMON LAW INFANCY DEFENSE
CRAIG S. LERNER*
Justice Thomas and the late Justice Scalia consistently argued that the original
meaning of the Eighth Amendment was to foreclose only those modes or acts of
punishment that were considered cruel and unusual at the time the Bill of Rights
was adopted. With respect to juvenile criminal responsibility, this would mean that
the Constitution contemplated an infancy defense no broader than what existed in
1791. Yet the common law infancy defense, as sketched by originalist judges, seems
barbaric. It treated all fourteen-year-olds as adults, and it permitted the imposition
of punishment—even capital punishment—on offenders as young as seven.
This Article argues that the common law infancy defense was more nuanced
than modern observers often recognize. With respect to misdemeanors, the defense
was more broadly applicable than is typical today. Even with respect to felonies,
offenders under the age of fourteen could be found liable only after an
individualized inquiry as to their capacity to distinguish right from wrong. The
eighteenth century culture and common law had higher expectations of juvenile
abilities than prevail today; and not surprisingly, young people proved more
mature than modern adolescents, who are told repeatedly that they are frail and
vulnerable. This Article speculates on how the original meaning of the Eighth
Amendment, assuming it incorporates the common law approach to juvenile
responsibility, might be applied to modern conditions, given the diminished
maturity of young people. However, the Article questions whether young people
today are as immature as advertised; indeed, the study of the common law
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infancy defense could prompt a reconsideration of contemporary attitudes about
the capacities of young people.
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INTRODUCTION
On July 21, 1786, the body of six-year-old Eunice Bolles, partially
buried by stones, was discovered near a road in New London,
Connecticut.1 Her skull had been fractured, her arms and face had been
bruised, and the prints of fingernails scarred her neck.2 The community
rallied to find the murderer, and suspicion fell upon twelve-year-old
Hannah Ocuish.3 Hannah, whose mother was a Pequot Indian, denied
wrongdoing; but her alibi, that a wall had fallen on Eunice, was
unconvincing.4 A tearful confession soon followed, to the effect that
Hannah was enraged when Eunice had earlier accused her of stealing
some strawberries.5 Convicted of murder, Hannah seemed oddly, even
disconcertingly, unconcerned.6 She may have been led to believe that
she was not in mortal peril.7 If so, she was mistaken. In delivering an
execution sermon, the Reverend Henry Channing elaborately
acknowledged Hannah’s youth, and regretted that a deficient religious
1. The facts of the case are drawn from the Appendix to the execution sermon of
the Reverend Henry Channing. See Reverend Henry Channing, A Sermon, Preached at
New London, December 20, 1786. Occasioned by the Execution of Hannah Ocuish, A Mulatto
Girl, Aged 12 Year and 9 Months, For the Murder of Eunice Bolles, Aged 6 Years and 6
Months, 1, 29–30 (1786).
2. Id. at 30.
3. Id. at 29–30.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 30.
6. Id. at 30–31.
7. Id. at 30.
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instruction had allowed Hannah’s “vicious disposition” to go
uncorrected.8 But, justice, he declaimed, required her execution, “for
‘Whose sheddeth Man’s blood, by Man shall his blood be shed.’”9
The past, it is said, is a foreign country, even, it would seem, when the
country is one’s own.10 It may be difficult for a modern observer to
recreate the cast of mind that would incline a community to execute a
twelve-year-old, regardless of the ghastliness of her crime. Over the past
four decades, courts throughout the country have rescued juveniles older
than Hannah Ocuish from judicial punishment. In 1988, the U.S.
Supreme Court determined that the Eighth Amendment and “evolving
standards of decency” foreclosed the execution of all persons who were
under the age of sixteen at the time of the offense.11 In 2005, the Court
expanded the constitutional prohibition of capital punishment to all
offenders under the age of eighteen.12 More recently, in Graham v.
Florida,13 the Court held unconstitutional the sentence of life without
parole when imposed on a juvenile convicted of any offense other than
homicide.14 And in Miller v. Alabama,15 the Court held life without parole
unconstitutional when imposed on juveniles in a sentencing scheme that
denied the judge the opportunity to consider youth as a mitigating factor.16
These cases are familiar to students of the juvenile criminal justice
system, but less recognized is their influence on the development of
constitutional law in the states. For example, the Iowa Supreme Court,
construing the Eighth Amendment and the state constitutional analog,
invalidated mandatory minimum sentences when imposed on
juveniles convicted of robbery.17 The California Supreme Court
8. Id. at 5–6, 14 (“A bad natural disposition if not early subdued will . . . bring
forth nothing but briars and thorns, to pierce a parent’s heart with many sorrows.).
9. Id. at 5–6 (quoting Genesis 9:6).
10. L.P. HARTLEY, THE GO-BETWEEN 17 (1953).
11. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821–23, 838 (1988).
12. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
13. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
14. Id. at 82.
15. 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
16. Id. at 489 (synthesizing Graham, Roper, and other cases requiring individualized
sentencing determinations in the capital context to conclude that a sentencing scheme
that mandates life without parole for juvenile offenders is unconstitutional and that
mitigating factors must be considered in juvenile sentencing); see also Montgomery v.
Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 729, 732 (2016) (announcing that Miller introduced a “new
substantive rule of constitutional law” and is thus retroactive on collateral review;
however, states are not required to relitigate sentences, rather, Miller violations may be
remedied by allowing juvenile offenders parole consideration).
17. State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 380 (Iowa 2014) (vacating and remanding the
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overturned a life without parole sentence imposed on a seventeen-yearold offender convicted of “special circumstances” first degree murder,
when the statute created a presumptive life sentence.18 And the
Connecticut Supreme Court rejected a 100-year sentence imposed on
a seventeen-year-old defendant who was convicted of homicide and
nonhomicide offenses and sentenced by a judge exercising
discretion.19 Given that the offenses included murder, the punishment
was not life without parole, and the sentencing scheme was not a
mandatory one, the Connecticut Supreme Court’s application of
Graham and Miller is triply mysterious, although the decision was
portrayed, however improbably, as an extrapolation of those cases.20
The logical premise of all of these cases is a claim about juvenile
responsibility—that is, that minors are categorically distinct from adults
in their moral agency. In the words of the Roper v. Simmons 21 Court,
quoted repeatedly in subsequent cases, juveniles, when compared to
adults, have a “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility”; they “are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative
influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure”; and their
characters are “not as well formed.”22 Flowing from these distinctions,
courts have reasoned, the penological rationales of deterrence and
retribution have less purchase with respect to juveniles than adults; for
juveniles are less capable than adults of conforming their conduct to
incentives, and their crimes are less reflective of an intractably bad
character.23 Punishments that are permissible when imposed on adults
seven-year mandatory minimum sentence of a seventeen-year-old who was prosecuted
as an adult); State v. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88, 89 (Iowa 2013) (vacating a seventeenyear-old’s fifty-year sentence for robbery and burglary).
18. People v. Gutierrez, 324 P.3d 245, 249, 257, 270 (Cal. 2014) (invalidating life
without parole sentence imposed on juvenile for “special circumstances” murder,
which statutorily created a presumption of a life sentence).
19. State v. Riley, 110 A.3d 1205, 1206, 1219 (Conn. 2015) (stating that the
defendant was entitled to a new sentencing hearing and instructing the lower court to
“consider as mitigation the defendant’s age at the time he committed the offenses and
the hallmarks of adolescence”).
20. Id. at 1206. The court in Riley determined that the term-of-years sentence was
“the functional equivalent to a life sentence without parole.” Id. Even though this
sentence was not mandatory, the court reasoned that under Miller, it had to consider
the defendant’s youth before imposing a sentence of de facto life without parole. Id.
21. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
22. Id. at 569–70 (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471–72 (2012) (stating that it is “common
sense” that juveniles’ developmental differences from adults lessen their culpability
and that many juveniles will reform as they mature); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48,
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are said to be “cruel and unusual” when imposed on minors, even for
the most serious offenses and even if such punishments were routine
This reasoning prompted dissenting judges—
centuries ago.24
specifically Justices Scalia and Thomas—to complain that the majorities
had disregarded the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment.25
Part I of this Article summarizes this originalist position, which
contends that the Eighth Amendment should be understood to
require an infancy defense no broader than what existed at the time
the Bill of Rights was adopted. However, that defense, as sketched by
originalist judges, seems indefensibly harsh to a modern observer, and
Justice Scalia has hesitated from embracing the complete realization
of his stated originalist principles. Part II reviews the relevant passages
on the common law infancy defense in foundational works by Matthew
Hale and William Blackstone. Through that consideration, the
common law emerges as remarkably nuanced, and in important
respects it is more congenial to the modern observer than one might
gather from Justice Scalia’s summary. Indeed, this Part shows that the
common law infancy defense enshrines principles that are embedded
in the law today and which still accord with our moral intuitions.
Part III acknowledges that the modern depiction of the young as
immature and reckless “adolescents” has been reflected in our legal
68 (2010) (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 570) (claiming that scientific evidence
demonstrates the developmental differences between juvenile and adult brains).
24. The cases do not explicitly address questions of race and poverty, although
such issues are often lurking in the background. The NAACP Legal Defense Fund has
regularly filed briefs on behalf of juvenile defendants, arguing that the imposition of
punishment on juvenile defendants disproportionately affects minorities. See, e.g.,
Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 1–3, 8, Graham, 560 U.S. 48 (Nos. 08-7412 & 08-7621)
(arguing that “[t]rust barriers may also be exacerbated by the cross-racial nature of
many attorney/child-client relationships”). Advocacy groups have regularly cited
racial discrepancies in seeking to overturn harsh juvenile punishment. See, e.g., It’s
Time to Talk About Race in the Juvenile Justice System, CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING
OF YOUTH, https://www.fairsentencingofyouth.org/its-time-to-talk-about-the-role-ofrace-in-juvenile-justice (last visited June 1, 2018). In Graham, the Supreme Court cited
a study finding that eighty-four percent of all juveniles sentenced to life without parole
for nonhomicide offenses in Florida were black. Graham, 560 U.S. at 63–64 (citing
PAOLO ANNINO ET AL., JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR NONHOMICIDE OFFENSES:
FLORIDA COMPARED TO NATION 2 (2009)).
25. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 608 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the majority’s
evolving standard of decency approach to the Eighth Amendment as a “mockery” of
the founders’ intent and accusing the majority of placing the “subjective views of five
Members of this Court and like-minded foreigners” above “the people’s laws”
approving the death penalty, which were enacted “barely 15 years ago”).

1582

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1577

system and, to some extent, has created what it presupposes: immature
and reckless youths. Consequently, it is possible that eighteen-year-olds
today are roughly as mature as fourteen-year-olds in 1791. This Article
speculates on how the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment,
assuming it incorporates the common law approach to juvenile
responsibility, might be “constructed” in modern conditions, given the
diminished maturity of young people.26 However, this Article concludes
with some skepticism about the extent of contemporary youth’s
immaturity; indeed, the study of the common law infancy defense could
prompt a reconsideration of contemporary attitudes about the
capacities of young people.
I.

THE SCALIA/THOMAS ORIGINALIST POSITION

Justice Thomas and the late Justice Scalia consistently argued that
the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment was to foreclose only
those modes or acts of punishment that were considered cruel and
unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was enacted.27 The catalog of

26. Cf. JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011).
27. Justice Scalia’s most complete statement of his interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment appears in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966–84 (1991); see also
Graham, 560 U.S.at 99 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(“The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was originally understood as
prohibiting tortuous methods of punishment, . . . akin to those that had been
considered cruel and unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted . . . .”); Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 349 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Eighth Amendment
is addressed to always-and-everywhere ‘cruel’ punishments such as the rod and
thumbscrew.”). Several originalist scholars have proposed alternative interpretations
of the phrase “cruel and unusual punishment.” Most notably, John Stinneford has
argued that the original meaning of “unusual” was to foreclose any punishment that is
contrary to “long usage or immemorial usage.” John F. Stinneford, The Original
Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. L.
REV. 1739, 1745 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). If Stinneford is correct,
then it is possible that the Amendment might reflect a broader exclusion of juvenile
punishments than existed at common law. If, for example, long usage was such that
seventeen-year-olds were not subject to the death penalty, one might be able to argue
that the traditional practice had fallen out of practice: Roper could then be defensible
on such originalist grounds. There was, however, no such long practice; consequently,
this argument is unavailing. Roper, 543 U.S. at 614 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Between
1990 and 2003, 123 of 3599 death sentences, or 3.4%, were given to individuals who
committed crimes before reaching age [eighteen].”). Cf. Stinneford, supra, at 1822
(“[T]he Supreme Court’s current practice of selectively striking down traditional
applications of the death penalty that have simply become less common—the death
penalty for seventeen-year-olds, for example—is almost certainly not justifiable under
the original meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.”).
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punishments permitted under the common law, as reflected in the
legal commentaries and reported cases of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries is, from a modern perspective, barbaric. This is
particularly the case with respect to juvenile punishment. In his
concurring opinion in Roper, Justice Stevens taunted Justice Scalia that
“[i]f the meaning of [the Eighth] Amendment had been frozen when
it was originally drafted, it would impose no impediment to the
execution of [seven]-year-old children today.”28 Justice Scalia did not
flee from this result; he reveled in it. Citing Hale and Blackstone,
Justice Scalia unhesitatingly acknowledged that the common law
permitted the execution of a seven-year-old, although he added that
“there was a rebuttable presumption of incapacity to commit a capital
(or felony) murder until the age of [fourteen].”29 Justice Scalia’s short
statement of the common law infancy defense would seem, puzzlingly,
designed to render the common law risible to a modern observer.
Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion in Miller is also problematic.30
The issue in that case was whether a mandatory life without parole
sentence could be imposed on a juvenile as a consequence of a
homicide conviction, or whether an individualized sentencing was
required.31 Justice Thomas begins his dissenting opinion by reiterating
his conclusion that the Eighth Amendment only prohibits methods of
punishment deemed tortuous at the time the Bill of Rights was
adopted.32 Given that introduction, one readies oneself for an
originalist response to Justice Kagan’s majority opinion. Instead,
Justice Thomas buries the originalist argument in a footnote:
When the Bill of Rights was ratified, [fourteen]-year-olds were
subject to trial and punishment as adult offenders . . . . Further,
mandatory death sentences were common at that time . . . . It is
therefore implausible that a [fourteen]-year-old’s mandatory prison
sentence—of any length, with or without parole—would have been
viewed as cruel and unusual.33

28. Roper, 543 U.S. at 587 (Stevens, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 609 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,
368 (1989); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23–24; 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE
HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 24–29 (Sollom Emlyn ed. 1736)).
30. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 502–09 (2012) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 465 (parsing the constitutionality of mandatory juvenile life without
parole sentences without consideration of mitigating factors).
32. Id. at 503 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 99
(2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
33. 567 U.S. at 503–04 n.2 (internal citations omitted).
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Thomas suggests that under an originalist view of the Eighth
Amendment, there can be no objection to a “mandatory death
sentence” imposed on a fourteen-year-old.34 But would he really
uphold such a practice today?
Justice Scalia had earlier conceded that he would, in fact, be
prepared to strike down such a punishment as “cruel and unusual.”35
In Thompson v. Oklahoma,36 Scalia conceded that if the issue posed was
whether a sixteen-year-old could be executed in a mandatory
sentencing scheme, which denied the judge the opportunity to
consider the defendant’s “maturity and moral responsibility,” he would
accept the “conclusion that such a practice is opposed by a national
consensus, sufficiently uniform and of sufficiently long standing, to
render it cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the
Eighth Amendment.”37 Scalia went still further, stating that he would
be willing to overturn a death sentence imposed on an offender
younger than sixteen if the law did not provide that the offender
enjoyed a “rebuttable presumption that he is not mature and
responsible enough to be punished as an adult.”38
Such conclusions are inconsistent with the common law infancy
defense, according to which a fifteen-year-old is conclusively presumed
to be a responsible adult.39 Scalia rejects this position; he would hold
not only that a fifteen-year-old is entitled to an individualized
sentencing, but also that he is constitutionally entitled to a presumption
of incapacity.40 This may reflect the modern era’s changed view of
juvenile responsibility, but it has no basis in the law as of 1791 and
therefore, at least according to Justice Scalia, the original meaning of
the Eighth Amendment.41 Thus, Justice Scalia repudiates his own
originalist interpretation of the Eighth Amendment with regard to
juvenile criminal responsibility.
When America’s most famous
originalist confronts the common law infancy defense in all its barbarity

34. Id.
35. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 859 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
36. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
37. Id. at 859 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
38. Id.
39. See MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 17, 22 (1680); see also
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 864 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing Blackstone and Hale’s
explanation of the age at which capital punishment should be prohibited at common law).
40. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 859, 864, 870–71 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 873. Justice Scalia ultimately faults the majority for failing to sufficiently
account for “the evolving standards of decency of our national society.” Id.
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he is apparently driven into the camp of “living constitutionalism.”42
Nor is Justice Thomas a bulwark of originalism in this respect. The
reasoning in his dissenting opinion in Miller is elusive on the crucial issue
in the case: mandatory life without parole when imposed on juveniles.43
Thomas devotes much of the dissent to proving that the common law
countenanced mandatory death sentences.44 This may be true, but is
not directly on point because the law cited by Justice Thomas did not
address the distinction between juveniles and adults.45 Justice Thomas
then recognizes that the sentence at issue in Miller is life without parole,
not death.46 At that point, Thomas abandons reliance on the common
law and focuses his argument on recent Supreme Court precedents.47
He writes, citing Harmelin v. Michigan,48 that “this Court has already
declined to extend its individualized-sentencing rule beyond the death
penalty context.”49 However, Harmelin involved a life without parole
sentence imposed on an adult, so again the central issue of juvenile
responsibility is skirted.50 With respect to that question, which is the
central question in the case, Justice Thomas buries the originalist
position in a terse footnote, which observes that fourteen-year-olds in
1791 were treated as adults in the criminal law.51
It is not common practice for judges to conceal crucial links of an
argument in a footnote.52 A truly originalist response to Justice
Kagan’s majority opinion in Miller could have elaborated on that terse

42. See Craig S. Lerner, Sentenced to Confusion: Miller v. Alabama and the Coming
Wave of Eighth Amendment Cases, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 25, 35–36 (2012).
43. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 502–09 (2012) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 506–07 (explaining that mandatory death sentences were common in
both federal and state penal codes from “the time of the [nation’s] founding
throughout the 19th century”).
45. Id. Indeed, the capital punishment cases that Justice Thomas cited all dealt
with the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty on adults. Id. at 505–07 (citing
Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 487 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring); Gardner v.
Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 371 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)
(plurality opinion)).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 507.
48. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
49. Id. (discussing Harmelin’s outcome).
50. Id. at 961–62 (outlining the adult petitioner’s appeal of his life without parole
sentence).
51. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 503–04 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
52. See, e.g., Richard Posner, Against Footnotes, 38 COURT REVIEW: THE JOURNAL OF
THE AMERICAN JUDGES 24, 24 (2001).
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footnote, demonstrating that sentencing practices as of 1791
conclusively presumed responsibility on the part of fourteen-year-olds.
An originalist opinion could have continued by arguing that fourteenyear-olds, considered to be adults, are not constitutionally entitled to
an individualized sentencing hearing for any punishment. Yet, as we
have seen, the difficulty is that Justice Scalia, in Thompson, specifically
disavows this argument as inconsistent with a “modern consensus.”53 If
originalists are willing to reject some aspects of the common law infancy
defense, when they are perceived as inconsistent with an emerging
“national consensus,” what reason is there for preserving other aspects,
when a new consensus has emerged? Resolving constitutional issues of
juvenile responsibility seems to turn, at least in Justice Scalia’s account,
not on the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment, but on the
status of a modern consensus. This hardly sounds like a principled
originalist argument.
II. THE COMMON LAW ON JUVENILE RESPONSIBILITY
Justice Scalia cites Hale’s History of the Pleas of the Crown (1680) and
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England (1769) for the
proposition that the common law condoned the execution of a sevenyear-old.54 Both works include a substantial treatment of the infancy
defense, which the authors group with other “capacity” defenses.55 For
each of these defenses, the offender concedes that he performed the
relevant act, but denies that he did so with the requisite human agency
to merit punishment.56 In a technical sense, Justice Scalia’s claim that
the common law permitted the execution of a seven-year-old is
accurate; however, when the common law infancy defense, particularly
as it emerged in the early American republic, is considered in its
totality, the law is revealed as more subtle than Justice Scalia’s caricature
suggests. The common law provided that any offender under the age of
fourteen enjoyed a presumption of incapacity, which could only be
overcome by compelling evidence of the defendant’s capacity to discern
53. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 817, 870 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
54. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 609 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing
BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *23–24; MATTHEW HALE, supra note 29, at 24–29).
55. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *21–26, *27 (examining the “infancy”
defense along with other capacity defenses like “madness,” “lunacy,” “intoxication,”
and “ignorance”); HALE, supra note 29, at 16–48 (same).
56. The treatments of the infancy defense in Hale and Blackstone are harmonious;
indeed, Blackstone borrowed freely from Hale in summarizing the infancy defense of
his own time. BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *22–24; HALE, supra note 29, at 16–29.
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the wrongness of his offense. Furthermore, as shown below, the
harshness of the common law infancy defense was reserved for felonies;
juvenile misdemeanants were provided a more generous defense than
what prevails in the law today.
A. The Law’s Varied Treatment of Age
Both Hale and Blackstone begin their treatments of the infancy
defense on the same note: by observing that the law’s treatment of age
varies widely depending on context and jurisdiction.57 As Hale writes,
there is one threshold for the capacity to enter into a contract—
twenty-five years in civil law counties, twenty-one in England—another
for the capacity to be an executor—seventeen in both jurisdictions—
and yet another for the capacity to enter into marriage—twelve for
females and fourteen for males in both jurisdictions.58 The criminal
law poses yet another context, with different rules. According to Hale
and Blackstone, the criminal law presumed that one was answerable
for criminal offenses at age fourteen, and, in some instances, minors
as young as seven years old could be found criminally liable.59
To this day, the law establishes widely varying age requirements for
such activities as participating in politics, consenting to medical
treatment, and getting married.60 A recent law review article faulted
the law’s “inconsistent” conceptions of maturity and its tendency to
“consider[] maturity narrowly and only on an ad hoc basis around
single issues.”61 Yet the law’s traditionally varied treatment of age is
defensible because, in different contexts, the law seeks to measure
different kinds of human “capacity.”62 One might, for example,
conclude that the human capacity that makes it fair to assign criminal
responsibility arises in virtually all individuals by the age of fourteen.63
By contrast, the law might conclude that the human capacity that

57. BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *22–23; HALE, supra note 29, at 16–17.
58. HALE, supra note 29, at 17.
59. BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *22–23; HALE, supra note 29, at 17–18.
60. Infra notes 167–69 and accompanying text.
61. Jonathan Todres, Maturity, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1107, 1110, 1113 (2012).
62. See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text (explaining the varying levels of
“capacity” in different legal contexts).
63. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *23 (stating that under ancient Saxon law,
an offender who was fourteen years old or younger “might, or might not, be guilty of
a crime, according to his natural capacity or incapacity”); HALE, supra note 29, at 25–
27 (“It is clear that an infant above fourteen and under twenty-one is equally subject
to capital punishments . . . and can discern between good and evil . . . .”).
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makes it fair to bind one to one’s contractual obligations arises later in
life.64 If there is merit to this hypothesis, the question for our purpose
is: what is the capacity that is most at issue in the context of the
criminal law? As we shall see, Hale’s and Blackstone’s answer to this
question—the capacity to discern good an evil—provides guidance in
establishing the threshold age for criminal culpability. Furthermore,
their answers, when properly considered, cannot be dismissed as
absurd even by a modern observer.
B. Misdemeanors
One crucial aspect to the common law infancy defense that is seldom
addressed in summaries of that defense today is the distinction
between capital crimes—or felonies—and misdemeanors.65 Hale and
Blackstone both begin their treatment of the infancy defense by
drawing this distinction and first addressing misdemeanors.66
What emerges is a law that is remarkably lenient for minors. Both
authors write that for misdemeanors, no criminal liability can arise
until the offender is fourteen years old.67 Even after that age, a defense
is sometimes available all the way to the age of twenty-one years, or later
than is the practice today.68 Hale and Blackstone draw a further
distinction between those misdemeanors that entail a breach of the
peace, such as riot and battery, and other misdemeanors, which are
characterized as ones of “mere non-feasance” or “omission.”69 With
respect to the first category—breaches of the peace—liability is
permissible, but only upon a demonstration that the offender was doli
64. See Larry Cunningham, A Question of Capacity: Towards a Comprehensive and
Consistent Vision of Children and Their Status Under Law, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. POL’Y,
275, 376 (2006) (“In the area of children and the law, inconsistency is not necessarily
a bad thing . . . . It is not unreasonable to conclude that our expectations of what
children are capable of will vary by age.”).
65. In Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. REV.
503, 510 n.20 (1984), the author alludes the distinction in a footnote. Other articles
mention the defense in the context of capital punishment cases but do not distinguish
between capital and misdemeanor offenses. See, e.g., Andrew M. Carter, Age Matters: The
Case for a Constitutionalized Infancy Defense, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 687 (2006).
66. BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *22; HALE, supra note 29, at 20.
67. BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *22 (limiting misdemeanor criminal liability of
offenders at least fourteen years old to “notorious breach[es] of the peace, a riot,
battery or the like”); HALE, supra note 29, at 20 (similarly indicating that offenders
under twenty-one should be immune from liability for all misdemeanors other than
riot or battery).
68. BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *22; HALE, supra note 29, at 20.
69. BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *22–23; HALE, supra note 29, at 20.
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capax, or, capable of committing a crime.70 With respect to other
misdemeanors—those of “nonfeasance,” which today would be called
acts of omission—a complete defense was available until the age of
twenty-one.71 Hale notes, for example, that misprision of a felony72
could give rise to criminal penalties for adults, but not for those younger
than twenty-one, who enjoy complete immunity.73
In reading Hale and Blackstone’s accounts of the infancy defense, the
modern reader is reminded of the scarcity of common law crimes. The
criminal universe at the time comprehended capital offenses,
misdemeanors involving a breach of the peace, and misdemeanors
involving nonfeasance.74 There were, of course, a limited category of
other offenses, such as fraud or extortion, and it is unclear how an
infancy defense would apply with respect to such crimes.75 Furthermore,
some of the most common juvenile offenses today did not exist in the
late eighteenth century, including drug possession crimes and the entire
range of “status offenses” such as truancy, drinking alcohol, purchasing
cigarettes, or violating curfew.76 We can only speculate how a common
law defense would apply in the context of crimes that did not exist in the
eighteenth century. But this uncertainty aside, the important point is
that at common law the infancy defense was broadly available with
respect to non-capital offenses.77
Indeed, the comparatively relaxed common law treatment of minor
juvenile indiscretions can be contrasted with the more stringent
handling of juvenile “delinquency” in our era. In his revisionist work,
The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency, Anthony Platt argued that
the modern juvenile justice system “invented . . . new categories of

70. BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *22–23; HALE, supra note 29, at 20.
71. BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *22; HALE, supra note 29, at 20.
72. The deliberate concealment of one’s knowledge of a felony. 18 U.S.C. § 4 (2012).
73. Hale writes, “If A. kills B. and C. & D. are present, and do not attach the
offender, they shall be fined and imprisoned; yet if C. were within the age of twentyone years, he shall not be fined nor imprisoned.” HALE, supra note 29, at 21 (footnote
omitted). The offense described is akin to misprision of a felony, that is, failing to
report a known felon to the authorities.
74. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *22–23; HALE, supra note 29, at 20, 22.
75. Both Hale and Blackstone’s accounts omit information regarding the infancy
defense as applied to these offenses.
76. See Claire Shubik & Jessica Kendall, Rethinking Juvenile Status Offense Laws:
Considerations for Congressional Review of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act,
45 FAM. CT. REV. 384, 385 (2007).
77. See supra notes 67–73 and accompanying text.
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youthful misbehavior,” often targeted at disfavored classes.78 By
contrast, in the more liberal common law era, juveniles were not subject
to the countless status offenses and misdemeanors prevalent today.79
C. Felonies
When Hale and Blackstone turn to capital offenses, they observe that
in “ancient law,” no criminal liability could attach until the offender
was twelve years old.80 Both authors indicate that they regard this
ancient law as defective, and approvingly note the common law’s
movement to a more rigorous definition of the infancy defense.81
Blackstone writes that conferring a defense on all those under twelve
was “dubious,” and Hale is in accord: “men grew to greater learning,
judgment and experience, and rectified the mistakes of former ages
and judgments . . . .”82
According to Hale and Blackstone, the common law eventually
lowered the threshold age for criminal liability to seven years.83 With
respect to offenders aged seven to fourteen, the question of capacity
was a factual issue for the jury to decide.84 Hale and Blackstone slightly
differ on the question of where to assign the burden of proof. Hale
argues that for offenders aged twelve to fourteen, the law presumed

78. ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 3 (2d ed.
1977); see also Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court—Part II: Race and the
“Crack Down” on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327, 330 (1999) (“Current punitive juvenile
justice policies reflect the . . . [f]ear of ‘other peoples’ children’ . . . .”).
79. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (noting certain misdemeanors that
exist today but did not exist in the common law era).
80. HALE, supra note 29, at 22. Blackstone calls it the “ancient Saxon law.”
BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *23.
81. It is not clear what time period Hale and Blackstone are referring to when they
refer to the “ancient law.” It is clear that as early as the fourteenth century, minors
under the age of twelve could be found liable and even executed. In a 1338 case, for
example, a ten-year-old was convicted of murdering a companion and then concealing
the body. The judge found him guilty, and ordered his execution, reasoning as
follows: “[B]y the concealment [the defendant] showed that he knew how to
distinguish between evil and good. And so malice makes up for age . . . .” Anthony
Platt & Bernard L. Diamond, The Origins of the “Right and Wrong” Test of Criminal
Responsibility and its Subsequent Development in the United States: An Historical Survey,
54 CALIF. L. REV. 1227, 1233–34 (1966) (footnote omitted).
82. BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *23; HALE, supra note 29, at 24–25.
83. BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *23; HALE, supra note 29, at 27–28.
84. BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *23 (“[I]f it appeared to the court and jury, that
[the offender] was doli capax, and could discern between good and evil, he may be
convicted and suffer death.”); HALE, supra note 29, at 27.
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that the offender was capable of committing a crime and could be
found guilty, whereas for offenders aged seven to twelve, the
presumption operated in the opposite direction.85 Blackstone seems to
indicate that the presumption is one of incapacity for the entire age
range.86 On the crucial question of how to determine capacity, the
authors are in accord: any offender aged seven to fourteen, should be
found capable and criminally responsible if the jury finds that the
defendant could “discern between good and evil.”87 Hale writes that the
common law upholds liability, even of a seven-year-old, “if it appear by
strong and pregnant evidence and circumstances, that he had discretion
to judge between good and evil.”88 Blackstone uses almost identical
language, noting that the common law assigns liability if a defendant—
again, even a seven-year-old—“manifested a consciousness of guilt, and
a discretion to discern between good and evil.”89
Neither author hints at any disapproval of the common law infancy
defense. Hale reports a case in which a nine-year-old committed murder
and then “hid the blood and the body.”90 Capital punishment was
appropriate, Hale concludes, although he adds that “[i]t is necessary
that [there be] very strong and pregnant evidence . . . to convict one of
that age, and to make it appear that he understood what he did.”91 In
that instance, the hiding of the body reflected that understanding.
Blackstone similarly reports instances in which murderers aged thirteen,
ten, nine, and even eight, were executed; in each case, the murderers
manifested a “consciousness of guilt” and a “discretion to discern
between good and evil.”92 Blackstone gives an example of such a case:
[I]n very modern times, a boy of ten years old was convicted on his
own confession of murdering his bedfellow; there appearing in his
whole behaviour plain tokens of a mischievous discretion: and, as

85. HALE, supra note 29, at 26.
86. BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *23 (stating that “the capacity of doing ill . . . is
not so much measured by years and days, as by the strength of the delinquent’s
understanding and judgment” and offenders under the age of fourteen “shall be prima
facie adjudged” incapable of committing a crime unless a jury found otherwise).
87. Id.; HALE, supra note 29, at 26.
88. HALE, supra note 29, at 26–27.
89. BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *23–24. In Blackstone’s example, the offenders,
“one boy of ten, and another of nine years old, who had killed their companions” were
sentenced to death because their actions—“that the one hid himself and the other hid
the body he had killed”—evinced consciousness of guilt. Id. at 23.
90. HALE, supra note 29, at 27.
91. Id.
92. BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *23–24.
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the sparing this boy merely on account of his tender years might be
of dangerous consequence to the public by propagating a notion
that children might commit such atrocious crimes with impunity, it
was unanimously agreed by all the judges that he was a proper
subject of capital punishment. But, in all such cases, the evidence of
that malice, which is to supply age, ought to be strong and clear
beyond all doubt and contradiction.93

Somewhat unspecified is the “dangerous consequence” of showing
leniency to the young; presumably, laxity in such cases would broadly
diminish the general deterrence of the criminal law. And Hale alludes
to a crime wave overtaking the country, and the consequent necessity
of dealing harshly with those who, by criminal violence, threaten the
social order.94
Although the common law infancy defense, as summarized here, will
strike the modern observer as barbaric, we should acknowledge certain
qualifications. First of all, it does not appear that, in actual practice,
the common law as of 1791 condoned the execution of a seven-yearold.95 The youngest offender Blackstone finds in his era was ten.96 The
eight-year-old he alludes to, as did Hale, seems to be John Dean, who
was convicted of arson in 1629.97 A second point is that with all minors
between seven and fourteen, there seems to have been, as a matter of
practice, an additional layer of caution, even after the verdict.98 Hale
notes that “it [was] prudence in such a case after conviction to respite
93. Id. at *24 (footnote omitted).
94. Id. There is a modern analogy: In the 1980 and 1990s, in the midst of surging
crime rates, observers on the political right and left argued that the rise of juvenile
“superpredators” made it necessary to stiffen criminal penalties even on youth
offenders. See Lara A. Bazelon, Note, Exploding the Superpredator Myth: Why Infancy Is
the Preadolescent’s Best Defense in Juvenile Court, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 159, 166–67 (2000).
95. Some scholars have contended that seven- and eight-year-olds were executed
in England in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, but documentation is scarce.
For example, Richard Brown writes that a seven-year-old English boy was executed in
1808, but it is unclear what supports this claim. See, e.g., RICHARD D. BROWN,
SELF-EVIDENT TRUTHS: CONTESTING EQUAL RIGHTS FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL
WAR 141 (2017). But see Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for Children: The American
Experience with Capital Punishment for Crimes Committed While Under Age Eighteen, 36 OKLA.
L. REV. 613, 615 (1983) (“[O]fficial records for the years 1801 to 1836 for the Old
Bailey, a major criminal court in London [found that] . . . [i]n 103 cases, children
under age fourteen were sentenced to death but none were executed.”).
96. BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *24.
97. Id. at *24, *25; see also Holly Brewer, The Historical Links Between Children, Justice,
and Democracy, 28 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. POL’Y 339, 348 (2006) (noting eight-year-old John
Dean was executed for burning two barns).
98. HALE, supra note 29, at 27.
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judgment, or at least execution,” so as to give the king an opportunity
to grant a pardon.99 Third, in the eighteenth century, some legal elites
recognized that minors, even as old as twenty-one, might be exempted
from the harshest of punishment. For example, Hale’s editor, Sollom
Emlyn, writing in 1736, disagreed with Hale on the appropriateness of
executing all minors convicted of capital offenses.100 Hale wrote that
“no man’s life or estate shall be safe” if minors can commit the most
serious crimes with “impunity,”101 but Emlyn raised an objection:
Our author’s argument concludes very strongly against their
escaping with impunity, but loses much of its force when urged in
behalf of capital punishments, for there is no necessity that if they
not be capitally punished they must therefore go unpunished; so
that whatever severity must be needful in cases of murders and acts
of violence, yet in the common instances of larceny and stealing,
some other punishment might be found, which might leave room for the
reformation of the young offenders.102

Justices Thomas and Scalia have written that the Eighth Amendment
excluded only those modes of punishment deemed cruel and unusual
at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted, but there were
disagreements on this issue within the legal community. Emlyn,
however obscure a figure today, wrote the introduction to the 1742
collection of State Trials.103 He advocated widespread reforms in both
civil and criminal law, including the more discriminating use of capital
punishment.104 On that last issue, the American Founders enacted laws
that more closely resembled Emlyn’s views than Hale’s.105 And to the
99. Id. In the modern era, the Supreme Court has suggested that executive
clemency is a “remote possibility.” See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 70 (2010). But
see Craig S. Lerner, Juvenile Criminal Responsibility: Can Malice Supply the Want of Years?,
86 TUL. L. REV. 309, 334 (2011) (arguing that the possibility of executive clemency is
“not always that remote”).
100. HALE, supra note 29, at 25 n.t.
101. Id. at 25.
102. Id. at 25 n.t (emphasis added).
103. SOLLOM EMLYN, 1 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE-TRIALS, AND PROCEEDINGS
FOR HIGH-TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANOURS; FROM THE REIGN OF KING
RICHARD II tO THE REIGN OF KING GEORGE II i (3d ed. 1742).
104. Id. at x (“Death is ultimum supplicium, and is therefore intended only for crimes
of the highest Rank; but when it is indiscriminately inflicted, it leaves no room to
difference of punishments of Crimes widely different in their own Nature.”).
105. Whether the American Founders were influenced by Emlyn is uncertain, but
there is overwhelming evidence that they read and admired the Italian thinker Cesare
Beccaria, who was renowned for his opposition to torture and capital punishment and
his insistence that punishments be proportioned to the offense. See John D. Bessler, The
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extent that the Eighth Amendment reflected the inclusion of a
common law infancy defense, as Justices Scalia and Thomas argued,
the American Founders may have been more willing than Hale to
“leave room for the reformation of young offenders.”106
D. Discerning Good and Evil
Justice Scalia’s shorthand account of the common law infancy defense—
to the effect that it would have permitted the execution of a seven-yearold—seems, puzzlingly, designed to render that law contemptible to the
modern observer. In light of the qualifications explored above, this
Section articulates an alternative, more sympathetic characterization.
The common law reflected the view that it was fair to impose
criminal liability on any fourteen-year-old, and even on those as young
as seven, provided that the crime in question is a capital offense.107 The
wrongness of such offenses—murder, rape, robbery, etc.—is selfevident to the juvenile human mind. As one strays from these core
crimes, moral judgments are apt to be more nuanced. Thus, the
crucial, albeit often neglected, aspect of the common law infancy
defense was its restriction to the most serious crimes.108 This must be
contrasted with the liberality of the common law defense with respect
to misdemeanors, sometimes exempting from liability even those as
old as twenty-one.109 With respect to such offenses, which may involve
subtle moral judgments, excusing minors is defensible. It is perhaps
believable that many minors lack the capacity to discern the wrongness
of the act; and, furthermore, the social harms attendant to the offense
are sufficiently insubstantial that an allowance can be made without
danger to the community.
But when the offense is capital, neither of these qualifications
applies. The logical and moral reasoning needed to apprehend the
Italian Enlightenment and the American Revolution: Cesare Beccaria’s Forgotten Influence on
American Law, 37 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 1 (2016). The Founders’ attitudes towards
punishment were, from a modern perspective, harsh, as evidenced by the Crimes Act of
1790. See An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 9,
§§ 9, 14, 33, 1 Stat. 112, 114, 115, 119 (1790) (codifying crimes such as counterfeiting
and piracy as punishable by “hanging the person convicted by the neck until dead”).
Nonetheless, American criminal law in the early Republic was less punitive than
England’s contemporaneous Bloody Code. See Bessler, supra, at 34–35.
106. HALE, supra note 29, at 25 n.t.
107. See supra notes 83–89 and accompanying text (detailing the common law’s
criminal liability for children from the age of seven through fourteen for capital offenses).
108. See supra Section II.C.
109. See supra Section II.B.
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wrongness of murder, for example, is elementary: any ordinary
fourteen-year-old possesses such capacity, and many, if not most,
younger minors do as well. On this point, modern science has done
much to buttress the common law—and common sense—view. Every
measure of cognitive power, such as pattern recognition and working
memory, demonstrates that human beings peak on average around age
fourteen.110 This accords roughly with the findings of the previous
century’s most famous child psychologist, Jean Piaget, who concluded
that children develop “adult-like reasoning abilities by age [fifteen].”111
Recent studies shed more light on the moral development of young
people, suggesting that even toddlers are capable of sophisticated
moral judgments.112 Steven Pinker, drawing upon the work of social
scientists, has written that young children are capable of remarkably
subtle moral reasoning:
Four-year-olds say that it is not O.K. to wear pajamas to school (a
convention) and also not O.K. to hit a little girl for no reason (a moral
principle). But when asked whether these actions would be O.K. if the
teacher allowed them, most of the children said that wearing pajamas
would now be fine but that hitting a little girl would still not be.113

The demonstrable ability of many young children to draw
sophisticated moral distinctions supports the idea, on which the
common law was premised, that children have no difficulty
recognizing the transparent wrongness of mala in se 114 offenses.

110. ROBERT EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST ADOLESCENCE: REDISCOVERING THE ADULT
173, 178, 184, 200 (2007).
111. The many works of Jean Piaget are synthesized in Wallace J. Mlyniec, A Judge’s Ethical
Dilemma: Assessing a Child’s Capacity to Choose, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1873, 1878–85 (1996).
112. See, e.g., Marc Jambon & Judith G. Smetana, Moral Complexity in Middle
Childhood: Children’s Evaluations of Necessary Harm, 50 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 22,
22 (2014) (“During the early school years, children begin to make rudimentary
distinctions between malevolent transgressions and those entailing mitigation
circumstances.”); Judith Smetana et al., Children’s Reasoning About Interpersonal and
Moral Conflicts, 62 CHILD DEV. 629 (1991) (concluding from a series of empirical studies
that “concerns with justice and interpersonal relationships” are observed in young
children); Judith G. Smetana & Courtney L. Ball, Young Children’s Moral Judgments,
Justifications, and Emotion Attributions in Peer Relationship Contexts, CHILD DEV., June 6.
2017, at 1, 1–2 (2017) (explaining that by three years of age, children can recognize
certain “moral violations as wrong because they are harmful to others not simply
because they are prohibited”).
113. Steven Pinker, The Moral Instinct, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 13, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/13/magazine/13Psychology-t.html.
114. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 258–59 (1952) (distinguishing
common law offenses from more modern regulatory offenses).
IN EVERY TEEN
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One can still wonder, as Emlyn did, whether punishment should be
meted out on minors with the same rigor as on adults.115 Such concerns
would be heightened in the eighteenth century, when so many felonies
were potentially capital offenses. Justice Scalia’s observation that the law
in 1791 countenanced the execution of a seven-year-old excites horror
today. But his observation does not correspond to actual practice.
Although eighteenth century Americans were notably more tolerant of
capital punishment than is commonplace today, it does not appear that
even they regarded it as proper to execute seven-year-olds.116 In all of
American history, there are only two reported executions of defendants
who were ten years old at the time of the offense, but one case is “poorly
documented,” and in the other, thirteen years separated the offense and
the execution.117 Thus, the common law, as it existed in practice, does
not support the claim that it permitted the execution of seven-year-olds.
Moreover, a distinction should be drawn between the common law
as it existed in England and the common law as it existed in the
American colonies and early American republic. Obviously, if Justice
Scalia is correct that the Eighth Amendment reflected the common
law infancy defense, the relevant law is that of America, not England.
It is apparently true, as Emlyn lamented, that the English criminal law
was often indiscriminate in its use of capital punishment.118 Even
English minors convicted of larceny were executed, at least as late as
the seventeenth century.119 However, this would not seem to have been
the American practice. Victor Streib’s painstaking analysis of the
juvenile death penalty in the United States failed to uncover a single
defendant convicted of mere larceny.120 From 1642 to 1899, ninety-five
juveniles were executed, broken down by criminal offense as follows:

115. HALE, supra note 29, at 25 n.t.
116. See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text (noting that very young juveniles
were seldom executed, even in Blackstone’s era).
117. VICTOR L. STREIB, DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILES 57 (1987).
118. HALE, supra note 29, at 25 n.t.
119. Brewer, supra note 97, at 348 (“Even in the late seventeenth century, young girls
of eight and nine years of age were hanged for picking pockets in London.”); see also
CLAIRE MCDIARMID, CHILDHOOD AND CRIME 103–04 (2007) (recounting that in Scotland,
“a boy of eight was hanged in 1629 for burning two barns and it appears that a brother
and sister aged seven and [eleven] respectively were hanged for felony . . . in 1708”).
120. See STREIB, supra note 117, at 57.
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Rape
Arson
Assault
Sodomy/Animals
Spy
Robbery
Unknown
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81
4
3
2
2
1
1
1121

Streib does not provide a list restricted to 1750 to 1800, which is the
most relevant period for our purposes.122 Nonetheless, his study
reveals that as a practical matter, the offenses that for juveniles gave
rise to capital punishment in America were murder and, in rare
instances, arson and rape. For other felonies, the punishments
imposed on juveniles were markedly less severe.123
The common law, as practiced in England and America, also
provided for an additional layer of protection for all offenders between
the ages of seven and fourteen: the jury had to find, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the offender could discern the wrongness of his
acts.124 Thus, the jury would be instructed to convict only if the
evidence showed not only that the defendant performed a specified
act and did so with a specified mens rea, such as premeditatedly or
intentionally, but also that the defendant discerned the wrongness of
the act.125 The 1806 trial of thirteen-year-old Mary Doherty, charged
with the murder of her father, is illustrative.126
121. Id.
122. It is likely that punishment practice evolved considerably. In this context, it is
worth noting that one of the sodomy convictions dates all the way back to 1642 and
therefore sheds no light on punishment practices in the Founding Era. See John D.
Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, America’s Death Penalty, and the
Abolition Movement, 4 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 195, 219 (2009) (describing the case of
Thomas Graunger, a Plymouth Colony teenager who was convicted of “buggery”
against numerous farm animals and consequently executed). Also, all of those
executed for rape must have been over the age of fourteen, as the common law
conclusively presumed that anyone under fourteen was incapable of this crime.
123. Illustrative is the case of eight-year-old George Stage, convicted in 1820 of
grand larceny, and sentenced to three years in the state prison. See Platt & Diamond,
supra note 81, at 1241 (discussing Stage’s Case, 5 City-Hall Recorder (New York City)
177, 178 (1820)).
124. See, e.g., State v. Doherty, 2 Tenn. 80, 82–84, 88 (1806); supra notes 84–87 and
accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text.
126. Doherty, 2 Tenn. at 80.
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The facts of the case are worthy of a CSI episode. Mary and her two
younger brothers were being raised by their reclusive father.127 After he
had gone missing for several days, two neighbors visited the house.128 His
body, with its head slashed, was discovered buried under the floor of the
house.129 Also discovered was an axe, recently scrubbed, with remnants of
blood clinging to the blade.130 The sheets had also been washed, though
blood was nonetheless found on them, and investigators concluded that
the victim had been in bed at the time of the crime.131 When questioned,
Mary failed to provide a convincing explanation of what had happened,
and her evasiveness intensified suspicions that she was the culprit.132
In short, the evidence of guilt was circumstantial but, at the same
time, overwhelming.133 What is striking is that the trial moved beyond
the traditional criminal law issues of actus reus and mens rea to a more
probing individualized inquiry into Mary’s capacity.134 Many witnesses
gave evidence on this issue. One neighbor testified that Mary “usually
did not talk much.”135 The jailer testified that she spoke only three
times and even then in “monosyllables.”136 He added that she occupied
her days laying in jail on a bed of straw, “covered with a blanket, [even]
in the hottest weather.”137 The prosecution introduced evidence about
Mary’s relatively normal interactions with a black girl, but the defense
rebutted with several witnesses who testified about her stony silence
while awaiting trial.138 The prosecution countered with evidence that
Mary had an “obstinate disposition” and hammered away at the facts
of the case, which were said to show a design to evade the law, and
therefore the necessary malice to support a conviction.139 The trial
judge instructed the jury:
If a person of fourteen years of age does an act, such as stated in the
indictment, the presumption of law is that the person is doli capax.
If under fourteen and not less than seven, the presumption of law is
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 85.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 85–86.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 84–86.
Id. at 84–85.
Id. at 84–86.
Id. at 87–89.
Id. at 81.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 81–82.
Id. at 87.
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that the person can not [sic] discern between right and wrong. But
the presumption is removed, if from the circumstances it appears
that the person discovered a consciousness of wrong.140

After a few hours of deliberation, the jury found Mary not guilty.141 The
verdict is most intelligible as the conclusion that the prosecution failed
to meet its burden of proving Mary’s capacity to discern right and wrong.
There was clearly something “off” in her behavior; she was no ordinary
thirteen-year-old. The jury likely concluded that, even assuming she had
committed what would otherwise be murder, her behavior suggested that
she did not display a “consciousness of wrong.”142
Not all minors were as fortunate as Mary Doherty. Minors could be
found criminally liable, provided the prosecution came forth with
persuasive evidence of the offender’s capacities.143 In one case, involving
the theft of a bear skin, the jury convicted an eight-year-old defendant,
and the judge sentenced him to three years in prison.144 The court
explained that the jury could convict an offender between the ages of
seven and fourteen only if it was satisfied, from “extrinsic testimony” or
“the circumstances of the case,” that he possessed the “capacity of
knowing good from evil.” In this case, the “fact of the concealment
and . . . an attempt to escape” provided the necessary proof.145
A modern observer might object that the common law infancy
defense unrealistically focused on a youth’s reasoning capacities. As a
consequence, the defense failed to recognize that some juvenile
offenders know right from wrong, but are unable to conform their
conduct to what they abstractly know. This critique of the infancy
defense resembles modern criticisms of the traditional insanity
defense. According to this argument, the M’Naghten rule146 was
premised on an overly cognitive view of human nature that had been
exposed as implausible by modern psychology.147 Such a critique,
140. Id. at 88.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., Platt & Diamond, supra note 82, at 1241 (citing Stage’s Case, 5 CityHall Recorder (New York City) 177, 178 (1820)).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See Daniel M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). Under the test
articulated in that case, “It must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing
of the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease
of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he did
know, he did not know he was doing what was wrong . . . .” Id. at 722.
147. See, e.g., Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d 908, 914 (5th Cir. 1969) (“We think
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however, implies that before the twentieth century people were unaware
that the human soul was a composite of many forces, of which reason
was often the weakest.148 There is no basis for thinking that two centuries
ago people were unaware of this incontestable truth.
Such a complete understanding of human nature was on view in the
1828 trial of James Guild, a twelve-year-old charged with beating an old
woman to death.149 The prosecution belabored the violence of the
crime.150 Character evidence was also introduced to overcome the
presumption of incapacity and prove that the defendant could discern
right from wrong.151 Miscellaneous witnesses testified to the effect that
“[h]e has a great deal of understanding,” and “[h]e is reputed a
cunning smart boy.”152 But even assuming that Guild “knew” what he
was doing was wrong, a modern observer might object that Guild’s
juvenile impulsiveness overwhelmed his reasoning capacities. As it
happened, a witness for the defendant, Stephen Albro, made precisely
that argument.153 Albro testified that he had visited the jail and talked
to the defendant, who “had intelligence enough to know when he did
wrong, but was wanting in discretion, and could not fully appreciate the
consequences of crime.”154 Under cross-examination, Albro persisted in
that the [the Model Penal Code approach to insanity] is called for in light of current
knowledge regarding mental illness.”), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 17, as recognized
in United States v. Long, 562 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2009); MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 cmt.
3 at 168 (AM. LAW. INST. 1985) (“The Model Code formulation is based on the view
that a sense of understanding broader than mere cognition, and a reference to
volitional incapacity should be achieved directly in the formulation of the defense,
rather than left to mitigation in the application of [M’Naghten].”); Christopher
Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental Disability in Criminal Cases,
86 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1210–11 (2000) (“M’Naghten was faulted because it focused solely
on cognitive impairment, thus failing to recognize volitional impairment.”).
148. The standard citation for Plato’s tripartite image of the soul is Book IV of the
Republic. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, bk. IV, at 439d4–441c7 (G.R.F. Ferrari ed., Tom
Griffith trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000). It should be noted that Socrates, at the
outset of this discussion, implies that the tripartite image provides only an imprecise
shortcut to the truth. Id. at 435b9–d5; see also id. at 443c9–444a2 (suggesting that the
soul may have more than three parts).
149. State v. Guild, 10 N.J.L. 163, 168–71 (N.J. 1828).
150. Id. at 165–66. A doctor testified in detail about the victim’s wounds: “her hair
clotted; her breast covered with blood, which was still flowing; her head dreadfully
mangled; the scalp loose and cut through; a large bruise on the right side of the head;
the under jaw broken. He should not have known her she was so disfigured.” Id. at 165.
151. Id. at 170.
152. Id. at 167.
153. Id. at 170.
154. Id. (emphasis added).
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what one might call a modern argument: “[The defendant] has
capacity to distinguish right and wrong; but I do not think he considers or
reflects as much as some.”155
Thus, the argument that juvenile impulsiveness overwhelmed
Guild’s reasoning abilities was ventilated in his trial.156 The jury, in
convicting Guild, presumably rejected Albro’s testimony.157 At the
same time, the guilty verdict and the law’s imposition of punishment
(death) were entirely consistent with a finding that Guild was young
and impulsive. Even if Albro’s account of Guild’s character were true,
the legal system never purports to give a comprehensive account of
human nature. There is no doubt that many people deemed legally
sane suffer from acute mental illness.158 There is equally no doubt that
many juveniles deemed adults for purposes of criminal culpability are
impulsive, vulnerable, and immature.159 The criminal justice system’s
finding of liability in such cases is limited to the purposes of the
criminal law. It is a claim that the criminal act is sufficiently a reflection
of moral agency that, within the criminal justice system, it is fair to
assign blame and socially useful to impose punishment.160 Guild could
thus be both young and impulsive on the one hand, and guilty of
murder—a crime punishable by death—on the other.
Over the course of the early to mid-twentieth century, the law of
insanity and juvenile responsibility evolved. As the requirement of
moral agency heightened, both defenses expanded. With respect to
the law of insanity, this movement culminated in the enactment of a
new test, reflected in the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code,
which extended the defense to those who “appreciated” that their
actions were wrong, but lacked the “substantial capacity . . . to conform
[their] conduct to the requirements of law.”161 The evolution of the
insanity defense is a complicated topic, but it is sufficient here to note
155. Id. (emphasis added).
156. Id. at 167–70.
157. Id. at 190.
158. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered,
58 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 791 (1985) (arguing that the American Medical Association
“impermissibly confuses psychiatric and legal concepts”).
159. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 49 F.3d 859, 868–69 (2d Cir. 1995) (transferring
the status of an “impulsive and immature” seventeen-year-old from juvenile to adult);
United Sates v. Juvenile Male, 844 F. Supp. 2d 333, 335–36 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding
that a sixteen-year-old should be transferred from juvenile to adult status, even though
he had been determined to be “emotionally immature” by a psychologist).
160. See Morse, supra note 158, at 780.
161. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (AM. LAW. INST. 1985).
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that the movement away from the traditional M’Naghten test was
eventually viewed, at least by many political actors, as a failure. By 2004,
a majority of states had abandoned the Model Penal Code and
returned to the M’Naghten test.162 Even many scholars questioned the
premises of the Modern Penal Code insanity defense, arguing that it
was fair to hold even some seriously mentally ill people accountable for
criminal offenses, given that “they retain substantial ability to control
their craziness and other behavior related to it.”163 The insanity
defense persists, but its scope is limited in jurisdictions that have
returned to the M’Naghten rule. In criminal cases in which the issue of
sanity is raised, the jury is required to make an individualized
determination that the defendant knew the wrongness of the act. Such
a finding is necessary first, from the perspective of retribution, to justify
punishment, and it is necessary second, from the perspective of
utilitarianism, to ensure that there is some margin, however thin, on
which deterrence is operating. A finding of criminal guilt does not
exclude the possibility that a defendant knew what he was doing was
wrong, but had difficulty, even great difficulty, conforming his conduct
accordingly.164 The insanity defense, as it exists in most American
jurisdictions today, in this respect resembles the common law infancy
defense: the focus is on what the defendant knew.
In sum, Justice Scalia’s statement that the common law infancy
defense would countenance the execution of a seven-year-old gives the
inaccurate impression of a law utterly foreign to modern sensibilities.
To be sure, the common law infancy defense is different from the
contemporary defense. To a great extent, this reflects different attitudes
towards youth, a topic pursued in the next Section. The point here has
been to demonstrate that the common law infancy defense enshrines
principles that are embedded in the law today and still accord with our
moral intuitions. The claim of the common law is this: if any defendant
charged with a serious criminal offense, regardless of age, could

162. Michael Louis Corrado, Responsibility and Control, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 59, 61–62 (2005).
163. Stephen J. Morse, Justice, Mercy, and Craziness, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1485, 1491
(1984) (reviewing NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1984)). But see
David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623, 1655 (1992)
(critiquing the “harshly punitive attitudes of legal actors” who would hold the mentally
ill and the insane criminally liable).
164. Cf. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 618 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is
entirely consistent to believe that young people often act impetuously and lack
judgment, but, at the same time, to believe that those who commit premeditated
murder are—at least sometimes—just as culpable as adults.”).
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discern right from wrong, then the community is justified in blaming
and punishing him.
III. RETHINKING THE INVENTION OF ADOLESCENCE
Near the end of his discussion of the infancy defense, Hale addresses
the question of whether the criminal law should treat males and
females differently.165 He answers in the negative:
[A]ltho the laws of England, as well as the Civil and Canon law, assign a
difference between males and females as to their age of consent to
marriage, viz., fourteen to the male, twelve to the female; yet it seems to
me, that as to matters of crimes, especially in relation to capital
punishments, the females have the same privilege of nonage as the males;
and therefore the regular [age of criminal culpability] . . . . is fourteen.166

By making it possible for a twelve-year-old female and a fourteen-yearold male to consent to marriage, the common law presupposed a level
of maturity among young people starkly different from contemporary
assumptions. In most American states today, marriage without parental
consent is not permissible until eighteen; in a few states the minimum
age is nineteen and even twenty-one.167 Other states do not specify a
statutory minimum age if parental consent is given, but legislation of
that sort has been under attack.168 Just months ago, the state of New
York amended its law to provide that, even with parental consent, the
minimum age for marriage is seventeen.169 In his signing statement,
Governor Cuomo called the change “a major step forward in our
efforts to protect our children.”170 The governor’s depiction of sixteen165. HALE, supra note 29, at 28.
166. Id.
167. HANNAH CARTWRIGHT, GLOBAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, LEGAL AGE OF CONSENT FOR
MARRIAGE AND SEX FOR THE 50 STATES (2011), https://globaljusticeinitiative.files.
wordpress.com/2011/12/united-states-age-of-consent-table11.pdf.
With parental
consent, some states permit marriage at younger ages. Emily Shugerman, New York
Passes Child Marriage Law Raising Age of Consent from 14 to 18, INDEPENDENT (June 21,
2017, 2:04 PM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/new-yorkmarriage-laws-marital-age-raised-14-178-governor-andrew-cuomo-a7800986.html.
168. US: New York Governor Signs Anti-Child Marriage Law, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(June 20, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/20/us-new-yorkgovernor-signs-anti-child-marriage-law (noting that twenty-seven states did not have an
age minimum “if a judge authorizes the marriage”).
169. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 15-a (2017).
170. Shugerman, supra note 167. The New Jersey legislature enacted an even more
stringent law than New York’s, prohibiting any marriages, even with parental consent,
of those younger than eighteen. Governor Christie vetoed the bill, stating there
should be an exception for sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds who have parental
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and seventeen-year-olds as “children” in need of protection is
reminiscent of Justice Kennedy’s characterization of minors in Roper
and Graham as vulnerable and undeveloped.171
Such sweeping statements of juvenile immaturity are problematic,
both descriptively and normatively, and in this respect, the common
law attitudes are worth revisiting. As a descriptive matter, the
categorization of teenagers as amorphously defective, vis-á-vis adults, is
doubtful. If the criterion is pure intellectual ability, young people are
at least on par with middle-aged adults and are likely superior to
septuagenarians and octogenarians.172
The case for juvenile
immaturity is thus based on supposed defects in minors’ judgment and
prudence. However, reading any biography of an eighteenth century
figure raises doubts about categorical claims of juvenile frailty. To take
one legendary example: Horatio Nelson, born in 1758—the sixth of
eleven children of a relatively prosperous family—joined the English
navy at age twelve as an ordinary seaman.173 While still in his mid-teens,
Nelson had already crossed the Atlantic, visited Jamaica and Tobago,
and served as coxswain on a trip through the Northwest Passage
towards the North Pole.174 Nelson’s life is in one sense extraordinary,
but in another sense typical of young Englishmen in the late
eighteenth century, who were often expected to achieve independence
at ages now sometimes called “preadolescence.”175 Observers at the
time commented that American youths were even more assertive and
independent than their European counterparts.176 As a contemporary
consent. Andrew Buncombe, New Jersey Governor Refuses to Ban Child Marriage Because
“It Would Conflict with Religious Customs,” INDEPENDENT (May 14, 2017, 6:06 PM),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/new-jersey-chris-christiechild-marriage-ban-fails-religious-custom-a7735616.html.
171. Shugerman, supra note 167; see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010);
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
172. See EPSTEIN, supra note 110, at 172–73 (arguing that intelligence may peak as
early as thirteen or fourteen).
173. ROBERT SOUTHEY, THE LIFE OF HORATIO LORD NELSON 3–4 (1813),
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/947/947-h/947-h.htm.
174. Id. at 3–5, 8.
175. MAX SUGAR, FEMALE ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT 120–21 (2d ed. 1993)
(illustrating that young people in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were
highly independent by today’s standards); Preadolescence, MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY (online ed. 2018) (defining preadolescence as “the period between the
approximate ages of 9 and 12”).
176. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 34 (Henry Reeve trans.,
1838) (observing that American youths were expected to have finished their education
and chosen a career by the age of fifteen).
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historian has observed, American children were at young ages
expected to enter the working world and “work was seen as leading to
self-improvement or future options.”177
The modern depiction of minors as somehow frail and vulnerable—
defective adults—has generated the invention, unknown in prior eras,
of the concept of “adolescence.”178 James Q. Wilson has written:
Society’s fundamental task has always been to socialize its youth,
especially during the tumultuous teenage years. Never an easy task,
it was in the nineteenth century easier than it is today because
adolescence—that recognized interregnum between childhood and
adulthood—did not exist. As soon as children were physically able
to work, they worked . . . . Today we live in a world in which an
intellectual invention—adolescence—has become a practical reality.
Large numbers of young people are expected to be free both of close
parental control and of the discipline of the market.179

It is not that prior eras were unaware that the young are in some ways
different from the middle-aged and that the attainment of adulthood
can be, as Wilson observed, “tumultuous,” but the modern era is
unique in the ways in which those supposed differences are reflected
in educational policy, labor laws, and the criminal justice system.180 We
are apt to see these differences as evidence of progress, emphasizing
the greater protections afforded to the young. There are less generous
explanations for the legal changes. Indeed, a skeptic might observe
that “[c]ompulsory education, child labor laws, and the like were
justified in great part by the desire to prevent children from asserting
independence.”181 Whatever the impetus for such laws, there can be
little doubt that the legal environment today is one in which minors
are treated as vulnerable and in need of protection.182 And given the
panoply of laws telling minors that they are irresponsible, it should not

177. Paula S. Fass, How Americans Raise Their Children: Generational Relations over Two
Hundred Years, 54 BULL. GER. HIST. INST. 7, 9–10 (2014).
178. For a helpful survey of the literature, see generally Frank A. Fasick, On the
“Invention” of Adolescence, 14 J. EARLY ADOLESCENCE 6 (1994).
179. JAMES Q. WILSON, ON CHARACTER 33 (1991).
180. See id. (arguing that socializing adolescents in the nineteenth century was easier
than it is today because adolescents were treated like adults); Fasick, supra note 178, at 7
(suggesting that the “marginality” of the modern adolescent might result from his
exclusion from work opportunities and compelled attendance at secondary schools).
181. Lee E. Teitelbaum, The Legal History of the Family, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1052, 1069–
70 (1987) (reviewing MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE
FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1985)).
182. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
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be a surprise that some minors act irresponsibly.
The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had a more generous view
of the capacities of the young, and this view was reflected throughout
the legal system.183 Significantly, in Hale’s account, the minimum age
for males to enter into marriage is the same as the presumptive age of
capacity for purposes of criminal liability.184 Different policy concerns
are implicated, but one can hypothesize that the minimum age for
criminal culpability generally tracks the age at which individuals are
perceived to be sufficiently mature to enter into marriage. In the early
years of the American republic, marriages entered into by males as
young as fourteen and females as young as twelve were “consistently
upheld,” even when parental consent was absent.185 This may seem
reckless and irresponsible on the part of the legal system, but we have in
mind the twelve- and fourteen-year-olds of the present day. What it
meant to be a fourteen-year-old in 1791 is quite different from what it
means to be a fourteen-year-old today.
Which brings me back to Justice Scalia. In his much-cited law review
essay, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, Scalia wrote that “most” nonoriginalists
would recoil from the extreme implications of their principles.186 Even
practitioners of living constitutionalism, he argued, would concede that
certain constitutional provisions are sufficiently determinate that the
original meaning still governs.187 For example, most nonoriginalists,
according to Scalia, “would not ascribe evolving content to such clear
provisions as the requirement that the President be no less than thirtyfive years of age.”188
In fact, there is a rich, if puckish, literature on precisely this point.
Frank Easterbrook, for example, has written that “thirty-five years”
could correspond to the “number of revolutions of the world,” but
could also imply “a percentage of average life expectancy,” which in
the modern world, implies a biological age of fifty. Alternatively,
“thirty-five years” could mean a “minimum number of years after
puberty,” which would now mean an age younger than thirty-five.189
Likewise, Gary Peller has written that “it is open to argument whether
183. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
184. HALE, supra note 29, at 22.
185. Vivian E. Hamilton, The Age of Marital Capacity: Reconsidering Civil Recognition of
Adolescent Marriage, 92 BOS. U. L. REV. 1817, 1829 (2012).
186. Antonin Scalia, Essay, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 851 (1989).
187. Id. at 863.
188. Id. at 862.
189. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 536 (1983).
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the translation in our social universe of the clause still means thirty-five
years of age.”190 He notes that “thirty-five years” could mean an older
biological age today, given that “children are actually given less
responsibility than in revolutionary times.”191 Finally, in 1996, Michael
Paulsen argued that the then-President had not achieved the degree
of maturity that was intended by the constitutional text as a
prerequisite for becoming President.192
In the spirit of Paulsen’s playful suggestion, consider this: even if we
accept the originalist claim that the Eighth Amendment embodies the
common law infancy defense, and that defense conclusively presumes
criminal responsibility at age fourteen and contemplates the possibility
of responsibility in children as young as seven, the question remains
what is intended by these biological ages. The ages were surely
understood to correspond to a certain level of maturity. However, a
fourteen-year-old today does not possess the maturity of his similarly
aged counterpart two centuries ago. The change in matrimonial
capacity laws suggests that an eighteen-year-old today possesses roughly
the maturity of a fourteen-year-old of 1791.193 According to this line of
argument, the modern infancy defense, and more broadly the criminal
justice system, should likewise acknowledge that the typical eighteenyear-old today is roughly as mature as the typical fourteen-year-old of
1791. As the common law insisted for all offenders under age fourteen,
so too should the law now insist for all offenders under eighteen: there
is only a presumption, necessarily rebuttable, that they possess the
requisite capacity to incur criminal liability. Liability under eighteen
can then attach only upon an individualized inquiry into the
defendant’s capacity. We have arrived, however improbably, at a livingoriginalist194 defense of the result in Miller, which holds that no
defendant, under the age of eighteen at the time of the offense, can
be sentenced to life without parole in a mandatory sentencing scheme
that denies the judge the opportunity to make an individualized
assessment of that defendant’s capacity.195
190. Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1174 (1985).
191. Id.
192. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is Bill Clinton Unconstitutional? The Case for President
Strom Thurmond, 13 CONST. COMM. 217, 219–21 (1996).
193. See supra notes 166–70 and accompanying text.
194. It may be originalist in the loose sense now popularized most notably in
BALKIN, supra note 26. For a criticism of this approach, see generally Nelson Lund,
Living Originalism: The Magical Mystery Tour, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 31 (2015).
195. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465, 483 (2012). Indeed, under the logic of
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This conclusion is premised, however, on the claim that young people
in the modern era really are as reckless and immature as advertised. In a
brief filed in Roper, to take one example, the American Psychiatric
Association argued that the juvenile death penalty is unconstitutional
because minors are unable to “perceive and weigh risks and benefits
accurately.”196 Stated in such sweeping terms, the claim is puzzling. Given
that animals astutely perceive risks and benefits, it is hard to believe that
adolescent human beings are utterly defective in this regard. And what
does it mean to “weigh risks and benefits accurately”? Do all adults,
including the millions who smoke cigarettes and underinvest in their
retirement savings? Curiously, prior to filing its brief in Roper, the
American Psychological Association sounded a different note on juvenile
capacities.197 In a case involving a challenge to a law requiring minors to
notify parents before having an abortion, that same organization cited a
“rich body of research” that concluded that by age fourteen or fifteen,
“young people develop abilities similar to adults in reasoning about moral
dilemmas, understanding social rules and laws, [and] reasoning about
interpersonal relationships and interpersonal problems.”198
The evidence on juvenile risk-taking is indeed rich and multifaceted. It is important to recall that both adults and juveniles vary
widely in their risk profiles. A claim that all juveniles are insensitive to
risk, legal and otherwise, is contradicted by much empirical evidence.
For example, one study found that changes in welfare benefits in the
1990s reduced teenage pregnancies.199 And in another study,
economist Steven Levitt found that for every juvenile delinquent
this argument, all mandatory minimum sentences imposed on juveniles are
unconstitutional. See State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 380 (Iowa 2014) (extending Miller
and reversing a mandatory minimum sentence of seven years imposed on a juvenile
convicted of robbery).
196. Brief for the American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 6, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633).
197. Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 6, 18–19, Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (No. 88-805)
(“[T]here is no empirical evidence to suggest that adolescents by about age 14 are less
competent to consent to abortion than adults, or that at least some younger
adolescents do not possess similar competence.”).
198. Id. at 18–19 (footnotes omitted). Justice Scalia noted this inconsistency in his
dissenting opinion in Roper. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 617 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
199. Moin A. Yahya, Deterring Roper’s Juveniles: Using a Law and Economics Approach
to Show that the Logic of Roper Implies that Juveniles Require the Death Penalty More than
Adults, 111 PA. ST. L. REV. 53, 94 (2006) (citing Phillip B. Levine, The Sexual Activity and
Birth-Control Use of American Teenager 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 7601)).
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incarcerated, there was a “reduction of between .49 and .66 violent
crimes for each delinquent-year of custody.”200 This conclusion is
striking in that the reduction is on par with or even greater than the
comparable reduction of adult violent crime. The upshot of Levitt’s
study is that juveniles—even those supposedly infantilized by modern
culture—are as sensitive to punishment as adults.201
In sum, the modern depiction of “adolescents” as immature has
perhaps become, to some extent, a self-fulfilling prophecy. The
holdings in Roper, Graham, and Miller, and more broadly the creation of
a separate juvenile justice system, based on the immaturity of teenagers,
presumes what it thereupon produces.202 Told how vulnerable they are
and then legally coddled, some young people emerge, unsurprisingly,
as immature. However, vague assertions that juveniles are immature or
cannot perceive risks mask a more complex situation. It is not surprising
that some juveniles, told that they are incapable of exercising judgment,
fail to exercise judgment. As James Q. Wilson observed, “we ought to be
thankful that any adolescents are left intact.”203
CONCLUSION
Let us conclude where we began, with the 1786 murder trial of twelveyear-old Hannah Ocuish.204 The length and solemnity of Reverend
Channing’s execution sermon are evidence that the community
recognized that the imposition of so severe a punishment on a person as
young as Hannah Ocuish required justification.205 To this end, Channing
emphasized the aggravating circumstances of the crime. He announced
that he was “[a]mazed at such an instance of cruelty and revenge in one so
young,” and added that “deliberate revenge and cruelty in one so young,
has scarcely a parallel in any civilized country.”206 Implicit in Channing’s
elaborate sermon is the acknowledgment that only upon a persuasive
showing of egregious conduct could hanging, the presumptive
punishment for adults convicted of murder, be appropriate.
200. Steven D. Levitt, Juvenile Crime and Punishment, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1156, 1176 (1998).
201. Yahya, supra note 199, at 85–87 (analyzing Levitt’s article).
202. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48,
73–74 (2010); Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
203. WILSON, supra note 179, at 34.
204. See supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text.
205. Richard Brown observes that within a decade of Hannah’s execution,
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Towards the end of the sermon, Reverend Channing addressed the
young people in the audience.207 Because Hannah was “mulatto,” many
of the white youths might discount the lessons from her crime and
punishment as somehow inapplicable to them.208 Channing corrected
this misimpression: “Think not that crimes are peculiar to the complexion
of the prisoner, and that ours is pure from these stains.”209 This is a
reminder to the white youths that the color of their skin did not entitle
them to any preening confidence that they are exempt from the
temptations of crime or that they would escape punishment because of
the color of their skin. Channing pursued this point:
Know, my brothers, that that casket [referring to Hannah]
notwithstanding its colour, contains an immortal soul, a Jewel of
inestimable value; which, polished by divine grace, would shine in
yonder world with a glorious lustre: while the Jewel in a brighter casket,
being left in its natural state, would be blackness and darkness forever.210

The plethora of religious metaphors may date the speech for many
modern readers. But the important point here is that Channing
addressed the young people in the audience not very differently from
how he addressed adults: by sketching the risks associated with crime.
Unlike the modern American Psychological Association, Channing
assumed that youths, much like adults, can be reasoned with and, when
addressed in this manner, are capable of conforming their conduct to
the community’s demands. Indeed, in the seventeenth and eighteenth
century, morally responsible people thought it appropriate to expect
teenagers to act like adults and to punish them like adults if, through
criminal offenses, teenagers failed to meet this expectation. The result
was, overwhelmingly, mature teenagers. Jarring to modern sensibilities,
the common law infancy defense was situated in a culture that was far
more demanding of young people than our own. That legal system and
that culture should prompt reflections on our own era’s legal treatment
of the young, and more generally on our cultural assumptions of
juvenile capacities that may be dubiously grounded in biological reality.
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208.
209.
210.

Id. at 23.
Id.
Id.
Id. Brown draws attention to this extraordinary passage. BROWN, supra note 95, at 143.

